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On Gödel’s “Platonism” ∗
Pierre Cassou-Noguès
CNRS, UMR SPHERE 7219, Paris (France)
Résumé : Cet article discute des analyses de Gödel sur la réalité des objets
mathématiques. Nous distinguons trois énoncés :
(i) Les mathématiques décrivent une réalité non sensible, qui existe indé-
pendamment des actes et des dispositions de l’esprit humain.
(ii) Les théories mathématiques ne sont pas créées par l’ego à partir de rien.
(iii) Les mathématiques (ou quelque chose dans les mathématiques) sont in-
dépendantes des propriétés spécifiques de l’esprit humain.
En nous appuyant sur ses archives, nous soutenons que Gödel ne peut pas
adopter le platonisme fort de l’énoncé (i) après 1954. Sa position est mieux
décrite par les deux énoncés, plus faibles, (ii) et (iii). Ceux-ci offrent deux sens,
indépendants, de ce qu’est « l’objectivité » en mathématiques, et l’on peut très
bien accepter l’un sans l’autre.
Abstract: This paper concerns Gödel’s conception of the reality of mathe-
matical objects. I distinguish three claims (i), (ii), (iii).
(i) Mathematics describes a non-sensual reality, which exists independently
both of the acts and [of] the dispositions of the human mind.
(ii) Mathematical theories are not created by the ego out of nothing.
(iii) Mathematics (or something in mathematics) is independent of the spe-
cific properties of the human being.
I argue that Gödel cannot hold such the strong Platonism of (i) after
1954. His position is better described by the two weaker claims, (ii) and (iii).
Claims (ii) and (iii) offer two different meanings for the idea of an ‘objectivity’
of mathematics, and philosophers can very well accept one without the other.
∗. This paper uses Gödel’s unpublished papers from Princeton University Library
which I could visit in February 2004 thanks to a Fellowship from the Society of the
Friends of Princeton University Library, and in February 2005, with the program
“Preuve”, from University Lille III. I wish to thank all the staff of the Rare Books
and Manuscripts Department for their help during my stay in Princeton.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 15 (2), 2011, 137–171.
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In philosophical literature, the name of Gödel is almost invariably
associated with strong Platonism. 2 By Platonism is meant a doctrine,
vaguely deriving from Plato, which holds that certain objects in math-
ematics have some kind of independent existence. There are various
versions of Platonism, and I will discuss several ones in the course of
this paper. However, Gödel himself is usually supposed to have em-
braced a strong, unqualified and hardly acceptable Platonism. That,
I claim, comes from a misunderstanding of Gödel’s writings. Relying
on Gödel’s unpublished papers (in particular on his drafts) to clar-
ify the statements that he makes in his articles or in his public lec-
tures, I will try to show that, at least after 1954, Gödel only makes
weak claims on the question of Platonism. As Gödel generally does,
I will use as synonymous the terms ‘Platonism’, ‘Objectivism’ and
‘Realism’. Some versions of ‘Platonism’, in Gödel’s sense, go better un-
der the denomination of ‘Objectivism’. I will come back later on on this
important question of terminology. 3
My point is not to defend Gödel’s position. I first want to show that,
contrary to what is commonly believed, Gödel cannot have held a strong
Platonist position all along the later part of his logico-philosophical ca-
reer. Moreover, during this discussion, different criteria for the objec-
tivity of mathematics will appear and different meanings of the term
‘objectivity’. Let us say, a criterion for the objectivity of mathematics
is an answer to the following question: On what conditions can we ad-
mit that mathematics has an objectivity? Or what would prove that
mathematics has an objectivity? A certain criterion being agreed on,
the Platonist has to show that mathematics does fulfil the conditions
for objectivity. The opponent can either denounce the criterion of the
Platonist or argue that mathematics does not fulfil the specified con-
ditions (he may, in fact, do both). 4 The criteria that one can find in
Gödel’s writings will be related to an ‘epistemic constraint’. However,
another question concerns the meaning itself of the objectivity of math-
ematics. In a nutshell, the question is: What exists independently of
what? First, what does the question of existence bear on? The objects
and relations, the universes described by our theories? Certain ideas
2. See for example [Parsons 1995], [Balaguer 1998], [Martin 2005]. See however
[Potter 2001].
3. See in particular quotations (4), (14), (19) and section 9. There is only one
exception, in a note transcribed by Wang [Wang 1996, 211]. For the rest, the three
terms are used as synonymous, referring to positions described by the same criteria.
4. I take these two aspects from two-fold discussion of [Wright 1992] in [Shapiro
2007].
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that are at the roots of our theories? For example, one could claim
that there is an objectivity of the concept of set without supporting the
objective existence of a universe of sets described by set theory in its
present state. Second, should the independence that is recognised to
this ‘something’ be referred to the human being (including the body),
to the human mind as it can be analysed by introspection, or to mind,
reason in general (admitting that there may exist non human rational
beings such as God, angels or Martians)? For example, one could argue
that mathematics is objective with respect to the human mind in the
sense that we are lead to certain theories and cannot but do, say, arith-
metic and set theory, although these theories depend on the structure of
our brain so that mathematics is not objective with respect to our whole
being nor to the mind in general.
Such questions on the meaning of the ‘objectivity’ of mathematics,
or on the nature of an ‘Objectivist’ position, are, I believe, at the centre
of Gödel’s analysis. They determine the meaning and the strength of his
Platonism. In fact, the misunderstanding of Gödel’s position precisely
comes from putting aside such questions. Gödel defines a ‘Platonist’,
a ‘Realist’, or an ‘Objectivist’ position by a weak claim so that his ad-
mission of being a ‘Platonist’ does not imply the strong doctrine that
is usually attributed to him. Aside from the reassessment of Gödel’s
position, my aim will be to distinguish, using Gödel’s writings, different
meanings of the objectivity of mathematics (different answers to a prob-
lem with two unknowns: What exists independently of what?) and to
show that these different versions of ‘objectivity’ permit an analysis of
the possible positions in philosophy of mathematics.
The bulk of this paper consists in a historical reading of Gödel’s
writings. Nevertheless, this reading will lead to distinctions between
kinds of objectivity in mathematics. These distinctions are, I believe, of
interest for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. They also permit
to analyse the tradition in philosophy of mathematics and compare, with
respect to precise claims, different positions. So to speak, this paper is
concerned with philosophy of philosophy of mathematics, but philosophy
of philosophy of mathematics may still be philosophy of mathematics.
I will start (section 1) by introducing and discussing three different
claims that stem from Gödel’s writings. I will then replace the two
first claims in the context of Gödel’s writings (section 2) and deal with
two problems that arise from these claims (sections 3 and 4). In the
remainder of the paper, I will explore several positions that give an
objectivity to mathematics but not in the sense of a strong Platonism.
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Section 5 (“Unconscious mathematics”) evokes a rather unlikely option
that is nevertheless hinted at in several of Gödel’s notes. Section 6
concerns Brouwer’s Intuitionism. It will lead to introducing the third
claim discussed in section 1. Section 7 analyses Gödel’s own position in
1964, which contradicts his earlier strong Platonistic claims. Section 8
deals with Husserl’s Phenomenology.
As concerns the historical reading of Gödel’s writings, the present pa-
per extends the discussion of [Cassou-Noguès 2005]. I will introduce new
material from Gödel’s Nachlass and give more importance to Gödel’s
interpretation of the position of other philosophers, such as Husserl.
Besides, Cassou-Noguès [Cassou-Noguès 2005] reviews Gödel’s early ar-
guments for his Platonism. I will, in the present paper, concentrate on
what I take to be Gödel’s main argument in his later writings, in order to
be able to discuss with more leisure its philosophical implications. I will
use the conversation with Wang (in [Wang 1996]) and the unpublished
papers kept at Princeton University Library. In particular, I will make
several references to the Philosophical Notebooks in C. Dawson’s tran-
scription from Gabelsberger to longhand German. This transcription is
still a draft.
1 Three claims
1.1 Strong and weak Platonistic claims
It is true, there are in Gödel’s writings several statements that, un-
ambiguously, make strong Platonistic claims:
(i) “[. . . ] Mathematics describes a non-sensual reality, which exists
independently both of the acts and [of] the dispositions of the human
mind.” 5
However, these strong claims are unusual. I do not know any such
claims in Gödel’s writings after 1954. I exclude unqualified assertions
(such as in the Grandjean questionnaire, in 1975: mathematical Realism
5. The complete sentence is: (1)
“[. . . ] the Platonistic view is the only one tenable. Thereby I mean
the view that mathematics describes a non-sensual reality, which exists
independently both of the acts and [of] the dispositions of the human
mind and is only perceived, and probably perceived very incompletely,
by the human mind.” [Gödel 1951, 323]
.
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“was my position since 1925” [Gödel 1986–2003, IV, 447]). As already
noted, the meaning of such assertions depends on what Gödel himself
understands as Platonism or Realism. And I will argue that, in Gödel’s
terminology, after 1954, ‘Platonism’, as ‘Objectivism’ or ‘Realism’, refers
to weak positions, defined by weak criteria. I will for example try to
show that the second version (of 1964) of the paper on Cantor (“What
is Cantor’s continuum problem?”) does not defend a strong position
such as (i), but only a weaker Objectivism such as discussed below
((ii) or (ii’)): Gödel in 1964 cannot hold (i). In fact, as we will see,
the lecture of 1961 (“The modern development of the foundations of
mathematics”) seems to take an even weaker position, with a claim that
frankly contradicts Gödel’s earlier and later arguments for the reality
of mathematical objects.
Moreover, it is clear that Gödel’s beliefs fluctuate. Thus, if one could
find an isolated strong claim (equivalent to (i)) after 1954, I would still
argue that (i) might reflect Gödel’s belief at the time the claim is made,
but does not express generally the conclusion of his arguments nor what
Gödel considers as a requisite for a satisfactory account of mathematics.
In Gödel’s view, the requisite for an account of mathematics is a weaker
claim such as:
(ii) “Mathematical objects and facts (or at least something in them)
exist objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions.” 6
or
(ii’) Mathematical theories are not created by the ego out of nothing.
Let me discuss briefly the difference between (i) and (ii), and the
equivalence between (ii) and (ii’). In a nutshell, (i) excludes two possi-
bilities, or two ranges of options, that (ii) leaves open. Let us call them
possibility (A) and possibility (B).
1.2 First possibility (A) for a weak Objectivism
Claim (ii) does not necessarily give an independent reality to the ob-
jects of our mathematics such as integers or sets. It refers to ‘something’
6. The complete sentence is: (2)
“[it] seems to imply that mathematical objects and facts (or at least
something in them) exist objectively and independently of our mental
acts and decisions, that is to say, [it seems to imply] some form or other
of Platonism or ‘realism’ as to the mathematical objects.” [Gödel 1951,
311] (Gödel’s emphasis)
.
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in mathematics. The objectivity of mathematics may come from ‘some-
thing’ out of which mathematical ‘objects and facts’, let us say mathe-
matical theories, are created. Claim (ii) does not imply that mathemati-
cal theories ‘describe’ an ideal reality but only that they are constructed
out of a reality, which they might not literally reflect. Claim (ii) only
means that there is at the basis of mathematics a material, a ‘some-
thing’ that is not created, even though mathematical theories may be
created by the human mind and may not, properly speaking, describe
this ‘something’.
Let us first remark that claim (ii) leaves open options that are not
usually associated with ‘Platonism’. For example, a traditional empiri-
cist (in the vein of Locke or Hume) who claims that mathematical objects
are created by abstraction from perceptual objects would comply with
claim (ii) but not with claim (i).
But the difference, in that perspective, between claim (i) and claim
(ii) may be clearer if we compare the situation in mathematics with that
of sense-perception. As we will see, this analogy, between mathematical
intuition and sense-perception, is crucial for Gödel’s position in 1964.
Let us imagine a description of an object of perception: the table on
which I write is ‘brown, hard, and smooth under the hand’. A ‘natu-
ral realist’, who believes that the objects of our perception exist as we
perceive them, will say, as in claim (i), that these words describe an
independent reality. Now a ‘physical realist’, who believes that reality
is the object of physics, will refuse that these words describe an inde-
pendent reality but will accept, as in claim (ii), that there is something
(atoms, light waves, etc.) in the perceptual object or at the root of our
perception which has an independent existence. In this first perspective,
the difference between claim (i) and claim (ii) is an analogue in math-
ematics to the difference, with regards to perception, between ‘natural’
and ‘physical’ realism.
Gödel’s position in 1964, in the second version of the paper “What
is Cantor’s continuum problem?” can be considered in the light of this
analogy. We have—Gödel argues—a kind of abstract or “ideal sensa-
tion”, on the basis of which we “form” mathematical objects. Thus,
there is an ideal reality at the roots of mathematics, just as for the
physical realist there is an independent reality at the roots of our per-
ception. Nevertheless, just as the words ‘brown, hard and smooth’
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do not describe physical reality, our mathematical theories may not
describe the ideal reality. 7
1.3 Second possibility (B) for a weak Objectivism
Claim (i) refers to the ‘acts and dispositions’ of the human mind,
whereas claim (ii) only refers to its ‘acts and decisions’. Now, in the
usual sense, a ‘decision’ is a conscious choice. It is made with some
freedom and it can be accounted for. One may ask for the reasons of
such or such a decision. On the other hand, a ‘disposition’ refers to a
faculty or an inclination, which leaves no choice and whose origin cannot
necessarily be traced. There is a difference between: ‘I decide to go to
bed early this evening’ (even though I do not feel sleepy, I must get up
early tomorrow); ‘I have a disposition to sleepiness in the evening’ (which
will eventually induce me to go to bed early even though I might rather
have worked a bit longer). On one side, we have a conscious choice, on
the other side, we have an inclination which we do not choose.
Now, in claim (i), Gödel declares mathematics independent of our
‘dispositions’, whereas, in claim (ii), mathematics only appears indepen-
dent of our ‘decisions’. Thus, in (ii), mathematical theories may be re-
lated to such an inclination, in the human mind, which does not involve
any choices and cannot be accounted for by an introspective analysis.
To take an example that is foreign to Gödel’s philosophy, a Cognitivism
which relates the axioms of the main mathematical theories (say, arith-
metic and set theory) to the properties of the human brain appears to
comply with claim (ii): for we do not freely decide our axioms but are
inclined, because of the properties of our brain, to use such and such
axioms. It shows that claim (ii) is a weak definition for the objectivity
of mathematics.
7. With regards to this distinction, an anonymous referee suggests that Gödel
could hold with respect to mathematics a third kind of realism. Consider the kind of
realism hold by Locke, with respect to perception. There would be in our perception
of an object properties which are entirely subjective, such as the colour—secondary
qualities—and—primary qualities—properties which belong to the object in itself,
such as the shape. The object in itself is acknowledged to have an independent
existence. Indeed, Gödel may have hold such a realism with respect to mathematics.
But it would still be too weak to comply with claim (i), for the description that we
can give of the object as it is perceived is not adequate to its reality or, in other words,
our sentence “brown, hard, and smooth under the hand” does not adequately describe
an object which exists independently of us. One may well hold in that perspective
that our representations of the object are constructed whereas the object itself has a
reality of its own.
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1.4 The equivalence between claims (ii) and (ii’)
Thus, as we have seen, claim (ii) is weaker than claim (i). It leaves
two open possibilities, (A) and (B), which are excluded in claim (i). Now
the equivalence between (ii) and (ii’) is partly a question of words. I will
distinguish two steps.
First, Gödel considers the ego as the sphere of consciousness: that
which produces our acts and decisions. In this manner, claim (ii), that
there is something in mathematics that cannot be referred to our acts
and decisions, is equivalent, in Gödel’s terminology, to the claim, which
we can momentarily call (ii”): There is something in mathematics which
the ego has not ‘created’, made up or invented.
The second step, from claim (ii”) to claim (ii’), seems to amount to
an equivalence of the form:: ∃x ¬P (x) is equivalent to ¬(∀xP (x)). If
there is something in mathematics which the ego has not created, then
the ego has not created everything in mathematics or the ego has not
created mathematics out of nothing. And conversely. In brief, saying
that there is at the basis of mathematics a material which the ego has not
created is equivalent to saying that the ego has not created mathematics
out of nothing.
Thus, claim (ii) is equivalent to claim (ii”), which is equivalent to
claim (ii’). We will see different texts where Gödel uses claims (ii) and
(ii’) as equivalent (in particular quotation (4) below). Let us stress
that claim (ii’), the ego has not created mathematics out of nothing,
may only mean that there is something in mathematics, which exists
objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions, and
does not necessarily imply that mathematical objects themselves ex-
ist objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions (see
earlier possibility (A)).
1.5 A third claim
In claim (ii), Gödel only denies that mathematical theories are cre-
ated out of nothing and by the ego, that is in a conscious activity that can
be reflected upon and analysed. As [Cassou-Noguès 2005], I will argue
that claim (ii) is Gödel’s only requisite with respect to ‘Platonism’. It is
a fact that Gödel does consider as examples of ‘Platonism’ positions that
comply with (ii) but not (i). Already, in the second quotation, Gödel
describes as ‘Platonism’ a position that is weaker than the one defined
in the first quotation.
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However, precisely because claim (ii) opens up a wide range of possi-
ble positions (such as a Cognitivism or, as we will see, an Intuitionism in
the style of Brouwer’s), it does suffice to define Gödel’s own position. To
reach a position that comes close to Gödel’s own, one must add another
claim, which, in Gödel’s view, is not directly related to the question of
Platonism:
(iii) Mathematics (or something in mathematics) is independent of
the specific properties of the human being.
An account of mathematics should make it clear that mathematics,
or something in mathematics, does not depend on properties that would
be characteristic of the human being and would not belong to any other
rational being. This third claim excludes positions like a Cognitivism
or, as we will see, Intuitionism.
Claim (iii) offers a specific problem. In claim (ii), the question is
whether mathematics can be considered as created in, or let us say in-
vented by the ego, the mind as it can be analysed by introspection. In
claim (iii), the question is: to what extent does mathematics depend
on our humanity? The two questions have a different orientation. It is
perfectly possible (we will see an example with Husserl) to argue that
mathematics is created by the ego but that no essential feature of this
creation is related to a specifically human nature.
In Gödel’s writings, the terms ‘Objectivism’, ‘Platonism’ or ‘Realism’
are applied to any position complying with claim (ii). Gödel does not
consider Cognitivism but, since Brouwer’s account of the origin of num-
bers seems to comply with claim (ii), Gödel explicitly considers intu-
itionism as a form of ‘Objectivism’. However, in wider perspective, one
may consider claim (iii) as an aspect of what is called the ‘objectivity’ of
mathematics in contemporary philosophy. If one is reticent to consider
Cognitivism as being on the side of the objectivity of mathematics, it is
because Cognitivism does not fulfil the conditions of (iii) even though it
may fulfil those of (ii). Claims (ii) and (iii) correspond to two different
meanings of the idea of ‘objectivity’.
Now, I must admit that I have not found claim (iii) explicitly formu-
lated in Gödel’s writings (one must remember however that only about
one half of the Philosophical notebooks have yet be transcribed from
Gabelsberger). I will argue nevertheless that (iii) is an essential feature
of Gödel’s philosophy of mathematics (see sections 7 and 8). In fact,
Gödel’s position can be summarised as the conjunction of (ii) and (iii).
The addition of (iii) to (ii) does certainly narrow the field of possibilities
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but these two claims do not contradict each other nor is their conjunction
equivalent to (i).
Let us compare again (as in 1.2.) the situation in mathematics with
that of perception. I describe the table on which I write as ‘brown, hard
and smooth’. If I am a physical realist, I will say that this description
is not adequate to the reality, which is made of atoms and light waves,
but that there is something in this ‘brown, hard and smooth’ object,
or at the root of this object, which has an objective reality. I might
also add, as in claim (iii), that, therefore, there is, in this ‘brown, hard
and smooth’ object, or at the root of this object, something which is
independent of the specific properties of the human being. In the same
way, if, as Gödel believes in 1964, we “form” mathematical objects on
the basis of an ideal sensation, we may refuse claim (i) but accept claims
(ii) and (iii).
I will discuss at length the relations between (i), (ii), (ii’) and (iii)
on the example of a number of philosophers, using Gödel’s own inter-
pretations of their writings. I will argue that Gödel’s position in 1964
complies with (ii), (iii) but not with (i), that Brouwer, in Gödel’s view,
complies with (ii) but not with (iii), and that Husserl might comply with
(iii) but not with (ii). I will also argue that Gödel changed his position
at least twice. I will distinguish three steps: before 1951, when he holds
a strong Platonism such as described by (i); 1961, when can only be
attributed to him a position even weaker than (ii) or (ii’); 1964 and af-
ter, when he seems to settle on the weak Platonism described by (ii) or
(ii’). I see no evidence of further changes after 1964. Now one question
is what motivates these changes. I will try (at the end of section 8) to
give a brief summary of Gödel’s moves but I simply have no answer as
to their motivations. 8
2 The argument for claim (ii)
The central claim of Gödel’s later writings is not that mathematical
objects, such as integers or sets, have an independent reality. It is rather
that mathematical objects have not been created ‘by the ego’ and ‘out
8. Above all, my aim is to show that Gödel does no longer believe in (i) after
1961, contrary to what is commonly believed. Now an anonymous referee for this
paper suggested that Gödel may never have hold (i). So let us underline that in
1951 Gödel does explicitly define Platonism as (i) and considers this Platonism as
the “only tenable position” (see above quotation (1) footnote 5)).
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of nothing’. This idea of a ‘creation out of nothing’ first appears in a
lecture of 1951.
It is related to a disjunction on which Gödel bases much of his latter
philosophy. Indeed, Gödel relies on his incompleteness theorem, as it
can be reformulated in terms of Turing-machines, to establish that
(3) either the human mind is not a Turing machine or there
exist arithmetical propositions that will remain absolutely
undecidable.
Both alternatives go against what Gödel calls materialism [Gödel
1951, 310]. Since, according to Gödel, the brain is a Turing-machine,
the first alternative shows that there is in the mind something that has
no correlate in the brain and, therefore, that exists independently of
the brain or any other material object. But the second alternative also
leads to the conclusion that there are such non-material entities. The
existence of absolutely undecidable propositions would imply, according
to Gödel, that there are some data at the basis of mathematics, which we
have not created and which simply cannot be material. More precisely,
mathematics is not ‘our own creation’:
(4) “For the creator necessarily knows all the properties of his
creatures, because they can’t have any others except those he
has given to them. [. . . Therefore,] mathematical objects and
facts (or at least something in them) exist objectively and in-
dependently of our mental acts and decisions, that is to say,
[it seems to imply] some form or other of Platonism or ‘real-
ism’ as to the mathematical objects. [. . . ] One might object
that the constructor needs not necessarily know every prop-
erty of what he constructs. For example, we build machines
and still cannot predict their behavior in every detail. But
this objection is very poor. For we don’t create the machines
out of nothing, but build them out of some given material. If
the situation were similar in mathematics, then this material
or basis for our constructions would be something objective
and would force some realistic viewpoint upon us even if cer-
tain other ingredients of mathematics were our own creation.
The same would be true if in our creations we were to use
some instrument in us but different from our ego (such as
‘reason’ interpreted as something like a thinking machine)” .
[Gödel 1951, 312]
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The last but one sentence was first written as:
(4’) “Similarly, of course, if mathematics were not created by
our acts (i. e. conscious acts of our ego) but by some entity
in us called reason, mathematical facts would be something
objective namely properties of this mind, which we could in
no way determine by our choices.” [Gödel s. d. a., box 8b,
folder 93, item 040294]
First, one can see in quotation (4) the equivalence between claim (ii)
and claim (ii’). What I earlier called claim (ii) is stated as the second
sentence of quotation (4). The reason, according to Gödel, for claim (ii)
is that “the creator necessarily knows all the properties of his creatures”
(in the first sentence of quotation (4)) whereas Gödel has, in this passage,
admitted the existence of absolutely undecidable propositions. Then
Gödel distinguishes two cases in which it would be false that “the creator
necessarily knows all the properties of his creatures”: (A) if the creation
was based “on some given material” (in the fifth sentence) and (B) if “in
our creation we were to use some instrument in us but different from
our ego” (in the seventh sentence or in quotation (4’)). What I earlier
called claim (ii’) excludes exactly these two cases: mathematical objects
have not been created by the ego out of nothing. Thus claim (ii’) implies
claim (ii). Conversely, it is clear that if the ego has created mathematical
objects out of nothing, one cannot hold claim (ii), that mathematical
objects (or something in them) exist objectively and independently of our
mental acts and decisions. Thus, claim (ii) and claim (ii’) are equivalent.
Second, one sees in quotation (4) that Gödel qualifies as “Platonism”
or as “realism” a position that complies with claims (ii) and (ii’), but not
necessarily with a strong claim such as (i). This will be important when
we come to the case of Intuitionism (in section 5).
Now, to sum up the point of quotation (4), Gödel here argues that
we cannot have invented mathematical theories, in our ego and out of
nothing. We cannot have created mathematical objects in this way,
for, if we had, we would know all that we have put in them, we would
know all their properties and there would be no undecidable proposi-
tions. However, mathematical objects as such need not have an inde-
pendent existence. Gödel leaves open two possibilities: (A) that math-
ematical objects have been created on the basis of something else, so
that mathematics has an objectivity even though its terms, such as in-
tegers, sets, are human creations; (B) that mathematical objects are
produced in a part of our mind, a ‘reason’, which is different from our
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ego and whose workings remain absolutely unconscious. Gödel always
maintains the clause that, when he denies that mathematics has been
created by us, he understands the term ‘creation’ in a specific sense:
creation out of nothing.
(5) “Gödel emphasises that to create means to make out of
nothing. That is why in creating mathematical objects, we
would give them all their properties. If to create were just
making something out of something else, then the situation
would be different.” 9
Gödel’s argument immediately raises several problems. First, in quo-
tation (4), the argument appears in relation to dilemma (3). It then relies
on the hypothesis that there exist absolutely undecidable propositions,
propositions that the human mind will never be able to prove nor refute.
But Gödel himself does not believe in the existence of absolutely un-
decidable propositions. He is convinced that the human mind can solve
any problem that it can formulate, either prove or refute any proposition
that it can understand: “For clear questions posed by reason, reason can
find clear answers” [Gödel 1961, 381]. 10
However, Gödel’s argument can also be seen outside the preceding
dilemma and without the hypothesis of absolutely undecidable proposi-
tions. Indeed, the following quotation gives a weaker criterion for the
objectivity of mathematics. It is related to an introspective, or phe-
nomenological, reflection: we have not invented mathematical theories
out of nothing, for, if we had, we would be able to learn all the properties
of their objects (prove all theorems of arithmetic) by reflecting on our
acts in creating these theories.
(6) “[. . . ] if man has created mathematical objects in the
sense of having made (i. e. imagined) them out of nothing
(not having built them out of something given like we build a
car), he must be able to know all their properties. For since
9. In a text from Wang corrected by Gödel [Gödel s. d. a., box 3c, folder 210,
item 013195].
10. Gödel here takes up Hilbert’s motto: there is no ignorabimus in mathemat-
ics. Of course, after the theorem of 1931, this does not mean that mathematical
theories should be decidable but only that the undecidable propositions of a mathe-
matical theory should be decidable in a stronger theory on the basis of evident axioms.
Concerning dilemma (3), Gödel believes both that the mind is not a Turing machine
and that there exists something in mathematics which the ego has not created, but
he only succeeds in proving a disjunction, instead of this conjunction.
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nothing was there before, everything in the thing created
must have been put into it by the creator and therefore the
creator either must know of it [crossed out: if the creator was
conscious or the creation such that it can be made conscious]
or must be able to learn it simply by raising his creative
activity from the subconscious to the conscious level (if he
could not do that, it would not be his creation but a creation
by something in him inaccessible to him).” [Gödel s. d. a.,
box 8c, folder 117, item 040396]
We will come back to this text while discussing the relationship be-
tween Gödel and Husserl (section 8). But, here, the objectivity of math-
ematics, the existence of something in mathematics which the ego has
not created, does no longer comes from the assumption of absolutely un-
decidable propositions but from the uselessness or, at least, the incom-
pleteness of a phenomenological, introspective reflection. We may reflect
on our thought processes or, to use a phenomenological terminology, our
‘life-experiences’ when we think about numbers, but we cannot in this
way discover all the properties of numbers, it follows that there is some-
thing in number theory which was not created by our thinking. Even
more clearly, the next quotation relates the objectivity of mathemat-
ics to our actual ignorance. The simple fact that mathematical objects
have properties that we still do not know implies their independence
from the ego:
(7) “It seems to me that the philosophical conclusion drawn
under the second alternative [the existence of absolutely un-
decidable propositions in dilemma (3) above], in particular
conceptual realism (Platonism) are supported by modern de-
velopments in the foundations of mathematics also, irrespec-
tively of which alternative holds. The main arguments point-
ing in this direction seems to me [to be] the following. First
of all, if mathematics were our free creation, ignorance as
to the objects we created, it is true, might still occur, but
only through the lack of a clear realisation as to what we
have created (or, perhaps, due to the practical difficulty of
too complicated computations). Therefore it would have to
disappear (at least in principle, although perhaps not in prac-
tice) as soon as we attain perfect clearness. However, modern
mathematics has accomplished an insurmountable degree of
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exactness, but this has helped practically nothing for the so-
lution of mathematical problems.” [Gödel 1951, 314]
It is clear in this text that our actual ignorance, the fact that there
are mathematical propositions which are undecidable in the current state
of our knowledge and despite the ‘perfect clearness’ achieved in the foun-
dations of mathematics, implies the objectivity of mathematics.
Quotations (4), (6) and (7) offer three different criteria for the objec-
tivity of mathematics in the sense of claim (ii): that there is something
in mathematics which we have not created in an activity that can be
reflected upon and completely analysed. In quotation (4), the criterion
is the existence of absolutely undecidable propositions. In quotation (6),
it is the mathematical sterility of a reflection on our thought processes
or, at least, the fact that such a reflection does not suffice for solving
open problems. In quotation (7), the criterion is our actual ignorance.
3 An objection
Now, Gödel realises that his argument, in quotation (7), can be the
target of an objection. As an exercise of logic, I devise axioms in the
predicate calculus for a certain domain of objects with certain relations.
I simply write down axioms specifying the properties of these objects and
their relations. I choose them arbitrarily, with no specific idea in mind.
And I start investigating the theorems following from these axioms. It
seems that I have created a mathematical theory from nothing and in
what appears to be a conscious act. These objects have properties which
can be deduced from the axioms but which I do not yet know and which
I will not discover simply by an introspective analysis of my activity (as
in (6)). At this point, I do not even know if my axioms are consistent. 11
Gödel does give an answer to this objection. The text follows quota-
tion (7):
(8) “Secondly, the activity of the mathematician shows very
little of the freedom a creator should enjoy. Even if, for ex-
ample, the axioms about integers were a free invention, still
it must be admitted that the mathematician, after he has
imagined the first few properties of his objects, is at an end
with his creative ability, and he is not in a position also to
11. This objection was raised by M. Detlefsen in personal conversation.
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create the validity of the theorems at his will. If anything like
creation exists at all in mathematics, then what any theorem
does is exactly to restrict the freedom of creation. That, how-
ever, which restricts it must evidently exist independently of
the creation.” [Gödel 1951, 314]
If one admits that the axioms of arithmetic are a free creation, or
when one freely imagines new axioms, theorems must still be deduced
from these axioms according to the rules of the calculus, predicate calcu-
lus, 12 and new axioms can only be introduced if they do not contradict
the axioms already stated. Now Gödel seems to argue that these rules
restrict the freedom of the creator and must therefore have a reality,
which is independent of the creator. In the case when one arbitrarily
devises a system of axioms, and imagines a new theory, this creation
presupposes the logic that governs the theory. It seems that this logic is
the ‘something’ out of which the theory is constructed and that it has a
reality of its own. Now, the rules of predicate calculus can be formulated
as schemata of inference. Gödel’s answer to the objection only makes
sense if we admit that these schemata do not by themselves determine
what the mathematician has to do. For, if not, the simple fact of writing
the schemata would account for the logic of the theory. Gödel’s answer
then means that, in order to apply the rules of the calculus, the mathe-
matician needs some intuition, some capacity, some inclination, which is
not by itself formulated in the schemata. It raises a problem comparable
to the problems of rules in Wittgenstein.
But let us put it in another way, which is closer to Gödel’s writings.
Given a system of axioms in predicate calculus, a Turing machine can
deduce all the theorems of the theory. In fact, giving a system of ax-
ioms is equivalent to giving a table of instruction for a Turing machine.
Gödel identifies then formal systems and Turing machines. A formal
system, according to Gödel, is a Turing machine. 13 Now, in quotation
(8), Gödel seems to argue that a mathematical theory, considered as a
conjunction of axioms, freely chosen, at least presupposes a logic or the
ability to deduce formulas according to rules. One could say that the
12. Let us consider only the case when the axioms are formulated in the predicate
calculus. If the axioms were formulated in a second order calculus, they would pre-
suppose anyway the notion of subset. The objects could not be said to be created
“out of nothing”.
13. “A formal system can simply be defined to be any mechanical procedure for
producing formulas, called provable formulas.” [Gödel 1934, in Gödel 1986-2003, I,
370]
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position of such a theory, which amounts to devising a Turing machine,
presupposes the concept itself of a Turing machine. Indeed, the concept
of Turing machine is, according to Gödel, an existing concept, which was
implicit in mathematical logic before Turing and that Turing only made
explicit. Turing did not create a concept but only made us see it more
clearly. 14 Eventually, Gödel’s answer to our objection would be that
mathematical creations at least presuppose one existing concept, that of
a Turing machine.
This point may have already been hinted at in the first version of the
argument (in quotation (4)). Gödel remarks, “we build machines and
still cannot predict their behaviour”. But the objection that we were
discussing amounts to saying that one may imagine new axioms (that is,
imagine a new Turing machine) and yet not know from the start whether
the axioms are consistent (that is, not be able to predict the behaviour of
the machine). But, as Gödel adds, these machines are built, or imagined,
from something else, which, in the case of Turing machines, can only be
the concept itself of a Turing machine.
4 The scope of Gödel’s argument
A second problem concerns the scope of Gödel’s argument. In a nut-
shell, an object that has properties which we do not immediately know
and which we cannot choose arbitrarily, needs not have an independent
reality as such but must either come from an unconscious part of our
mind or be constructed out of something else. That argument could
apply to any object, not only mathematical objects, but also percep-
tual and fictional objects. Perceptual objects obviously have properties,
which we do not know and which cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The
same could be argued of fictional objects, like characters in a novel. The
14. “It is well known that A. M. Turing has given an elaborate definition of the
concept of a mechanically computable function of natural numbers. This definition
most certainly was not superfluous. However, if the term ‘mechanically computable’
had not a clear, although unanalysed, meaning before, the question as to whether
Turing’s definition is adequate would be meaningless, while it undoubtedly has an
affirmative answer.” [Gödel 1972, in Gödel 1986-2003, II, 275, note 5]
“The sharp concept is there all along, only we did not perceive it clearly at first.
[. . . ] We had not perceived the sharp concept of mechanical procedures before Turing,
who brought us to the right perspective. And then we do perceive clearly the sharp
concept”; conversation with Gödel quoted in [Wang 1996, 232, 235], [Wang 1974, 84].
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writer does not seem to invent his or her characters step by step. 15 They
appear as a whole and the writer must let them live so to speak, listen to
them, before he or she can describe their features and learn their story.
Fictional characters seem to fall under the conditions of Gödel’s argu-
ment. Of course, one would be tempted to relate fictional characters to
the unconscious of the writer. The writer would create his character un-
consciously, or to use Gödel’s word, in a part of his mind different from
his ego and over which his ego has no control. That would be why they
have properties that the writer himself does not know they have. At
least, it is more tempting to relate fictional objects to the unconscious
than mathematical objects. However, Gödel himself always chooses the
realistic side in his argument.
(9) “Fictional characters are empirical. In contrast, the
concept of set, for instance, is not obtained by abstrac-
tion from experience”; conversation with Gödel quoted in
[Wang 1996, 138]
Fictional characters, according to Gödel, would then be constructed
out of something else. They would be abstracted from their model,
contrarily to mathematical objects, which would have no such model
in perceptual experience. One might raise objections against this po-
sition. But, at least, it is consistent with Gödel’s argument on the
reality of objects.
There is an earlier note on fictional characters. It was written in
1942. Gödel did not have his argument, which seems to appear in 1951.
(10) “With regard to the sentences of a fiction (Sätzen der
Dichtung), one can also ask whether they are true or false.
So the writer creates a peculiar reality. But, because of the
human imperfection of the writer (in contrast with the cre-
ator of the real world), that question might not always have
an answer (for example, he did not think of that or he con-
tradicted himself).” [Gödel s. d. b., XI, 19]
This second note is rather ambiguous. On one hand, fictional ob-
jects are set in a parallel world, where sentences concerning them could
be true or false. Gödel (vaguely) anticipates the theory developed by
D.K. Lewis. On the other hand, this world is said to be ‘created’ by the
15. Among numerous possible examples, see [Giono 1961], Stevenson’s “Chapter on
Dreams” in [Stevenson 1892].
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writer, and consciously created (since the writer must think of this or
that). Thus fictional characters, as elements of this parallel world, do
not have an independent reality or any kind of objectivity. This early
note is not consistent with Gödel’s argument on the reality of objects.
5 Possibility (B): dream mathematics
I will for the rest of this paper concentrate on the question of mathe-
matical objects. As we have seen, when Gödel argues that mathematical
objects are not ‘created’, he means ‘created’ by the ego (that is, in a con-
scious activity) and out of nothing. That leaves open two possibilities:
(A) that our objects are created on the basis of something else (as Gödel
seems to believe even in the case of fictional characters), or (B) that
our objects are the product of an unconscious part of our mind (as one
would be tempted to believe in the case of fictional characters). I will
start with this possibility (B).
That option would turn mathematics into something like a dream, a
story that is unconsciously produced and of which we do not know the
end, nor the meaning, though we are making it up. However, Gödel does
not dismiss at first hand possibility (B). In fact, there are, in Gödel’s
papers, several items relating to this ‘unconscious’ reason. They all
oppose the ‘ego’ as the domain of conscious acts, and a ‘reason’ which
would be “some instrument in us but different from our ego” (see (2)),
“something in him inaccessible to him” (see (5)), some entity “in contact
with our ego but to which our ego has no access”, “an entity different
from it but in contact with it”. And, in that sense:
(11) “In mathematics, [the] question is to find out what we
have perhaps unconsciously created.” [Gödel s. d. b., box
8c, folder 117, item 040403]
And, after a similar remark, in another note,
(11’) “The method for the foundation of knowledge is then
psychoanalysis.” [Gödel s. d. a., V, 344]
However, I do not know any item in Gödel’s papers that would clearly
explain what this ‘reason’ could be, how mathematical objects could be
related to such an unconscious part of our mind. Still, there may be two
ways of seeing this reason. First (as already discussed in [Cassou-Noguès
2005]), Gödel asserts in several places that science relies on a conceptual
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apparatus that is constituted during childhood. In a letter to C. Reid,
Gödel speaks of:
(12) “the conceptual outfit, which, in our culture, we acquire
in about the first 15 years of our life and which is in no
way enlarged but only applied in a more and more involved
fashion by science today.” [Gödel s. d. a., box 1c, folder 137,
item 011853]
Now, these concepts, acquired during childhood, could then become
(to use Husserl’s vocabulary) ‘sediments’. Our concepts are related to
certain activities (both mental activities and practices in the real world).
The process of sedimentation (which Husserl analyses with respect to the
“Origin of geometry” in [Husserl 1936]) describes the way an activity that
is at the origin of a concept obliterates itself after the concept is consti-
tuted. The concept remains in use but the activity that has produced
the concept falls into oblivion, so that the constitution of the concept
cannot be re-enacted, and the concept itself (its meaning, its scope, its
origin) now appears as problematic. Such a process could apply here. If
we form the basic concepts of our science, including mathematical con-
cepts, during our childhood, their ‘sedimentation’ would mean that the
adult cannot analyse their origin. Our concepts would appear then as
unconscious products. Now, Gödel relates such mathematical concepts
as the concept of set to the concept of object, the concept of a ‘thing’.
In several notes, Gödel seems to assert that the concept of set could be
derived from the concept of object, as it is used in daily life or natural
language. 16 In that perspective, the child would form the concept of ob-
ject, and the adult could derive from it the concept of set, without being
able to analyse its origin, without being able to re-enact the processes
that have given him this ‘something’ out of which he now builds his
mathematical theories. I will give later on another quotation on Husserl
that also goes in this direction.
But there is a second way to look at our mathematical unconscious.
It is more metaphysical. In an earlier note, of 1946, Gödel mentions
the possibility that we see mathematical truths in God’s mind. In that
16. For example, “in the generation of the idea of one object out of its various
aspects, if we abstract from the interrelations of the aspects, the one object generated
would be the set of which the aspects are constituents provided we thought of these
aspects as objects.” [Gödel s. d. a., Box 3c, folder 207, item 016167]. It is a text
from Wang, but corrected by Gödel and entitled “Quotations from Gödel”. See also
[Cassou-Noguès 2005].
On Gödel’s “Platonism” 157
perspective, this reason in us (over which we have no control) could be
conceived as a part of God’s mind, linked to our ego or to which our ego
would be in contact. We would then take mathematical truths, or some
of them that we use as axioms, in God’s mind and without being able
to understand its workings or the way ‘He’ arrived at these truths. 17
I do not argue that either of these two perspectives expresses what
Gödel believes. 18 They simply represent two ways of understanding
this mathematical unconscious, which Gödel mentions, consistently with
his writings. Another way, which would not be congenial to Gödel’s
perspective, would be, as already noted, to relate mathematics to the
brain—the axioms used in the main theories to the properties of the
brain. Mathematics would then be objective in the sense of claim (ii).
6 Brouwer and Dedekind: towards ‘objec-
tivity’ in the sense of claim (iii)
A surprising example of the weak Objectivism expressed in (ii) is,
in Gödel’s view, Brouwer’s account of the origin of arithmetic. Brouwer
relates the origin of numbers to the passing of time in a (mythical)
consciousness. At the beginning, the consciousness is filled with a unique
sensation. But, with the passing of time, this sensation divides itself in
two, a sensation that is now past and a new sensation that is present.
This later sensation again divides itself in two, and so on. One simply
has to ignore the actual content of these sensations to obtain the series
of natural numbers.
Gödel sees in this account another example of what he means by
‘creation out of something else’. Indeed, numbers, in Brouwer’s account,
are not created freely; we do not choose their properties. Numbers are
17. Gödel remarks that the right, or the objective, formulation of a mathematical
proposition is “the one that is realised in God’s understanding”: “It is seen in God”
[Gödel s. d. b., XIV, 7–8]. One finds a similar remark: “Ideas and eternal truths are
pieces of the divine substance. It does not follow that God has created them (since
God does not create itself) but they make the essence (das Wesen) of God” [Gödel
s. d. b., XI, 31].
18. An anonymous referee for this paper suggests that the second position—we see
mathematical truths in God’s mind—is the right one and describes Gödel’s Platonism.
I don’t think that, even though Gödel does mention this possibility, there are many
textual evidences for it. Moreover, since this position is metaphysically expensive,
to say the least, it would still be worth trying to find in Gödel’s texts hints at more
plausible positions on mathematical objectivity.
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created from or according to the passing of time, which, in Brouwer’s
text, appears as a phenomenon over which we have no power. Numbers
have then objectivity. Or they can be considered as created from some-
thing else that has objectivity. That is enough to comply with Gödel’s
requirement:
(14) “ ‘The intuition of one-twoness’, according to Brouwer,
‘creates not only the numbers one and two, but also all finite
ordinal numbers, etc.’ Here the meaning is to make some-
thing out of something else, it is construction according to
certain principles. If we create mathematical objects in this
sense, it does not mean that there are no [here H. Wang
puts a question mark which Gödel crosses out] mathematical
objects not created by us. Creation in this sense does not
exclude Objectivism.” 19
Brouwer’s thesis that natural numbers are the creations of a
Consciousness does not in itself contradict Gödel’s notion of objectiv-
ity. Brouwer complies with Gödel’s weak claims for ‘Objectivism’ or,
indeed, ‘Platonism’. It is true that Gödel does not—and it would be
awkward to—qualify Intuitionism as ‘Platonism’. Gödel only uses the
term ‘Objectivism’. However, we have seen earlier (in quotation (4)
in particular) and will see again (in quotation (19) in particular) that
Gödel does qualify as ‘Platonisms’ positions complying only with the
same weak claims, (ii) or (ii’): that the ego has not created mathematical
objects out of nothing. The same claims define, in Gödel’s terminology
‘Objectivism’, which he uses very rarely, and ‘Platonism’. With the ex-
ception of a note transcribed by Wang [Wang 1996, 211], the two terms
always seem to be synonymous.
That Brouwer complies with Gödel’s claims for the objectivity of
mathematics shows the weakness of these claims. Indeed, it comes from
19. It is a text from Wang which he describes as “a few more pages of my notes of
[Gödel’s] sayings”. It is heavily corrected by Gödel [Gödel s. d. a., box 3c, folder
209, item 013183]. Also, in another note written by H. Wang corrected by Gödel:
“Both Brouwer and Riemann speak of creating mathematical objects in our mind.
But they do not mean or at least cannot cons[istently] mean creations [Gödel adds:
out of nothing]. Rather they must mean creation [Gödel adds: out of some given
element and] according to principles [Gödel crosses out Wang’s text and adds: which
these elements permit]. The idea is analogous to physical construction, where we can
combine given material to make new things [Gödel adds: but we can combine them
only in ways permitted by these things (e.g. we cannot combine the hardness of the
diamond and the chemical composition of the wood)]” (in box 20). See also [Wang
1996, 225].
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the fact that Gödel only refuses the idea of a creation by the ego and out
of nothing. It is interesting to compare this use of the idea of creation
in mathematics to that of Dedekind in The nature and meaning of num-
bers. In the preface, Dedekind asserts that “numbers are free creations
of the human mind” [Dedekind 1888, 31]. 20 However, by this, Dedekind
does not mean that numbers would be freely created by the mind out of
nothing. Creating, for Dedekind, rather means that starting from a cer-
tain set (a simply infinite system) one can ignore the particular content
of its elements and retain only the properties one does need for doing
mathematics. The numbers are the result of this abstraction. But, since
one chooses the properties that one retains, and since numbers, after
this abstraction, are true objects, different from the ones which they
have abstracted from, the mathematician is justified in seeing numbers
as her or his creations: “With reference to this freeing the elements from
every other content (abstraction) we are justified in calling numbers a
free creation of the human mind” [Dedekind 1888, 68].
It is because of his peculiar use of the idea of creation that Gödel
may object to Brouwer that, in his own doctrine, numbers are not
freely created: they are created out of something else. 21 Brouwer’s
account, interpreted in this way, then seems to comply with Gödel’s
requirement for the objectivity of mathematics. However, there still
must be something in Brouwer’s position that Gödel rejects. The di-
vergence between Brouwer and Gödel (concerning what mathematical
theories should be, what kind of axioms and inferences may be used) is
too wide to be simply a matter of personal choice, as if Brouwer’s account
could be acceptable to Gödel but simply less appealing than a clear-cut
Platonism. The question, therefore, is to understand exactly what in
20. This point was suggested to me by M. Detlefsen.
21. Indeed, this reading of Brouwer is a criticism at least of the letter of the intu-
itionist philosophy. As M. Detlefsen shows, Brouwer’s requirement that mathematical
objects be constructed in intuition, and that an exhibition of the objects be always
possible, is related to the idea (stemming in Brouwer’s case from German idealism)
that subjective acts are transparent to themselves, so that the subject can always
analyse what he has himself constructed. Brouwer’s requirement “is to be understood
in terms of the supposedly special knowledge that a freely creative agent has of her
free creations. The idea behind it is roughly that our epistemic position with respect
to that which we create is better than our epistemological position with respect to that
which we do not create” [Detlefsen 1998, 319; M. Detlefsen’s emphasis]. M. Detlefsen
clearly uses Gödel’s vocabulary. However, what Gödel argues against Brouwer, is
that his account of arithmetic starts with the intuition of time, which itself is not
created by the subject and which therefore remains as an opacity, blurring the clear
vision that the creator should have of his creations.
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Brouwer’s position Gödel eventually rejects. It is not in itself the thesis
of a creation of mathematical objects, which, as we just have seen, may
be acceptable to Gödel.
There may be a difference concerning the nature of mathematical
intuition but I think that Gödel’s main divergence with Brouwer is re-
lated to the status of time. In Brouwer’s philosophy, time may be a
phenomenon that belongs to any consciousness, any mind. However, in
Gödel’s view, time is a character of our mind that does not belong to
any mind:
(15) “For a being which had no sensibility at all
(i. e. no contact through sensations with reality) but
only ‘pure understanding’, no time at all would exist.”
[Gödel 1986–2003, III, 427]
Or, with another specification, in an earlier paper:
(16) “For a being with no sensibility at all [crossed out: i. e.
not imbedded in the world with our sense organs] (i. e. which
would have no body in the material world) but were to con-
sider it only from the outside (by ‘pure understanding’) no
time would exist [. . . ]. It must be ass[umed] in addition
that the understanding of this being were so perfect that
it does not need marks on paper (or memory pictures in
the brain) (which as material processes are only possible in
space and time) as crutches but would penetrate all concep-
tual rel[ations] in one glance.” [Gödel s. d. a., box 9a, folder
131, item 040418]
In Gödel’s view, this being or, maybe, these beings, of which God
is an example, should be able to do mathematics, and arithmetic. But,
according to Brouwer’s account, they would not, for arithmetic appears
to depend on time, whereas they do not know time. What Gödel refuses
in Brouwer’s account is not in itself the thesis of a creation of numbers
but the fact that arithmetic is related to time, which is a specific property
of the human mind.
The thesis that arithmetic should not be related to time appears ex-
plicitly with reference to Kant. As is well known, Kant distinguishes
in the Critique of Pure Reason, between analytic judgments, where the
predicate is contained in the concept of subject, and synthetic judg-
ments, where the predicate is not contained in the concept of the sub-
ject, and therefore, where the predication relies on intuition. In Kant’s
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view, mathematical propositions are synthetical. Geometrical proposi-
tions rely on the intuition of space. Thus, in order to prove that the sum
of the angles of a triangle is equal to a flat angle, the geometer draws
a figure, a triangle and a straight line going through one summit and
parallel to the opposite side of the triangle. The geometer literally sees
the theorem on the figure. On the other hand, arithmetical propositions
rely on the intuition of time. To verify an equation, such as 5+7=12, one
must count, count five apples, then seven apples, which makes twelve ap-
ples. Now, to count a series of objects, one must be able to notice them
one after the other. In that, arithmetic is related to the time structure
of our internal life. Geometry and arithmetic, in Kant’s view, are a pri-
ori because they refer to these two forms of intuition that are innate in
the subject: space as the form of external intuition, time as the form of
internal intuition.
In an early paper, “Intuitionism and formalism”, from 1912, Brouwer
refers to Kant’s theory of arithmetic. According to Brouwer, non
Euclidean geometries refute the Kantian thesis that space, Euclidean
Space, is the a priori form of external intuition. We can prove, in the
same way, propositions that refer to objects in the Euclidean space and
propositions that refer to objects in a non Euclidean Space. Therefore,
if these proofs are based on a construction in intuition, the form of this
intuition cannot be the Euclidean space. The first thesis, that space is
an a priori structure, must be abandoned. However, Brouwer takes up
the second thesis, that time is the a priori form of internal intuition, i. e.
the fixed structure of our mental life, and that arithmetic is founded on
the intuition of time.
On the other hand, Gödel explicitly rejects this Kantian thesis. He
refers to an earlier essay where Kant had not yet developed his theory
of arithmetic. Gödel notes:
“This writing is interesting also for the reason that it avoids
the faulty analogy: arithmetic/time and geometry/space but
instead holds that the concept of time gives rise to cinematic
while the concept of number is considered to belong to the
sphere of abstract thinking and to require pure intuition (of
either space or time) only for its actuatio concreto.” [Gödel s.
d. a., box 8b, Folder 95, item 040295, draft for Gödel 1951]
As show quotations (16) and (17), the refusal to relate arithmetic
to time comes from the fact that, in Gödel’s view, there exist rational
beings outside time, such as God, who should be able to do arithmetic
162 Pierre Cassou-Noguès
or, more generally, some mathematics comparable to ours. Therefore,
there must be at least something in mathematic which is independent of
this specific property of human minds: being in time.
This discussion on Brouwer’s intuitionism leads us to introduce a new
claim (earlier claim (iii)). This claim gives a new meaning to the objec-
tivity of mathematics. However, though it is at the root of Gödel’s rejec-
tion of Brouwer’s account of arithmetic, this third claim does not seem
to appear explicitly in Gödel’s writings. Gödel qualifies as ‘Objectivism’
positions such as Brouwer’s complying with claim (ii). As we have seen
in quotation (14), Gödel explicitly acknowledges that Brouwer’s account
illustrates his idea of ‘Objectivism’, since numbers appear to be created
out of something over which the ego has no control. Gödel’s own posi-
tion concerning the nature of mathematics seems to be determined by
the conjunction of claim (ii) and claim (iii). But, in his terminology,
claim (iii) is not related to the question of ‘objectivity’, which is solely
determined by claim (ii).
7 Gödel in 1964
Let us look again at claims (i), (ii) and (ii’). Brouwer’s account,
according to Gödel, complies with claims (ii) and (ii’). But it can in
no way comply with claim (i). That shows (and we will see again later
on) that claim (ii) is sufficient to characterise an ‘Objectivist’ position.
Claims like (i) may have expressed Gödel’s believes in 1951 (or until
1954). 22 But they do not express the conclusion of his argument (see
quotation (2)). And it seems that Gödel himself will abandon such a
position as defined by (i), in favor of a weaker position defined by claims
(ii) and (iii). I will take the example of the supplement of 1964 to the
paper “What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?”
At first sight, Gödel does seem to make strong Platonistic claims.
The question of mathematical objects is considered as analogous to the
question of sense objects, the objects of perception:
22. A claim comparable to (i) still appears in a letter to G. Gunther from 1954.
Gödel writes: “[. . . ] I say that one can (or should) develop a theory of classes as
objectively existing entities. [. . . ] They seem rather to form a second plane of reality,
which confronts us just as objectively and independently of our thinking as nature”
[Gödel 1986–2003, IV, 504–505].
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(17) “The question of the objective existence of the objects
of mathematical intuition [. . . ] is an exact replica of the
question of the objective existence of the outer word.”
“I don’t see any reason why we should have less confidence in
this kind of perception, i. e. in mathematical intuition, than
in sense-perception.” [Gödel 1964, 268]
Mathematical objects must then have the same reality as sense ob-
jects. But, precisely, Gödel denies that sense objects as they appear to
us have an independent reality. Sense objects are constituted on the
basis of sensations. We then contribute, by certain mental processes, to
shaping our objects from the data that we receive from the outside. The
same goes for mathematical objects:
(18) “It should be noted that mathematical intuition need not
be conceived of as a faculty giving an immediate knowledge
of the objects concerned. Rather it seems that, as in the
case of physical experience, we form our ideas also of those
objects on the basis of something else, which is immediately
given. Only this something else here is not, or not primarily,
the sensations.” [Gödel 1964, 268]
We have a mathematical intuition. That, for Gödel, is “a mere psy-
chological fact” [Gödel 1964, 268]. It does not imply that the objects
of our theory have an independent reality. The objects are already in-
formed by the subject, just as the objects of perception. Mathematical
objects are merely constituted by the subject on the basis of some datum,
“something that is immediately given”. Gödel does not deny that there
is an ideal reality at the basis of mathematics. But he cannot hold that
mathematical theories literally describe that ideal reality. Mathematics
may rely on but does not describe an independent reality, and what it
seems to describe, a universe of sets, does not exist independently of
the mind. In fact, in Gödel’s ‘Platonism’, mathematical objects, such as
sets, may be seen as “mixture of subjective and objective elements”:
(19) “The second alternative [that mathematical objects are
created out of something else] is perfectly sufficient to prove
the Platonistic point of view. For they then exist in the same
sense as physical objects since our ideas of these no doubt
are a mixture of objective and subjective elements.” [Gödel
s. d. a., box 20, from Gödel’s hand on a text by Wang, my
emphasis]
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Such notes show that Gödel has abandoned the clear-cut Platonism
defined by claim (i). In 1964, Gödel does not defend (i) but is only con-
cerned with weaker claims, such as (ii) or (ii’). These claims, (ii) and
(ii’), are sufficient for what Gödel calls a ‘Platonistic view’. They are
the same criteria that Gödel used to show that Brouwer’s Intuitionism
is on the side of ‘Objectivism’. There seems to be no difference be-
tween ‘Platonism’ and ‘Objectivism’ in Gödel’s terminology, except that
the tradition in philosophy of mathematics makes it easier to apply to
Intuitionism the second than the first.
Even though Gödel believes that mathematical objects are created
out of something else, a datum that has an independent reality, he is
ready to consider seriously any position that complies with the weak
requirement that mathematical objects are not created by the ego out of
nothing (with then also possibility (B), that mathematics is related to
an unconscious reason). What Gödel denies is only that mathematical
theories are entirely designed in a conscious activity, that we choose
the properties of our objects in an act comparable to a decision. That is
Gödel’s Platonism. As quotations (2), (4), (7), (14) and (19) show, Gödel
qualifies as ‘Platonism’, ‘Objectivism’, or ‘Realism’, positions complying
simply with claim (ii), or (ii’), and not necessarily with (i). Thus one
must be cautious when Gödel says of himself that he is a Platonist. He
is not generally using the term in the sense of (i).
Gödel’s requirements for the objectivity of mathematics are weak.
Intuitionists such as Brouwer may comply with them. A Cognitivist,
who would relate mathematics with properties of the brain, would also
comply with them. A Sociologist, who would relate mathematics with
social structures (arguing that the mathematics that we do depend on
the education that we receive or the influence of such and such sci-
entific institutions), would comply with claim (ii), since, though our
mathematics may be accidental, their feature could not be said to be
chosen by the ego.
Thus the strong claims in Gödel’s epistemology do not come from
his conception of the objectivity of mathematics. The difficulty is not in
his ‘Platonism’ but comes from elsewhere. Let us recall the discussion
with Brouwer. Gödel explicitly states that Brouwer’s account “does not
exclude ‘Objectivism’ ” (see quotation (14)). Gödel’s own position and,
eventually, his rejection of intuitionism seem to depend on another claim,
which is not directly related to the question of objectivity (at least, in
the sense in which Gödel understands the word). Gödel believes that
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(iii) Mathematics (or something in mathematics) is indepen-
dent of the specific properties of the human mind.
This claim is not clearly formulated in Gödel’s writings. However,
it is clear (see for example quotations (15) and (16)) that Gödel does
believe in the existence of rational beings that are not human and do
not possess the same properties as the human mind. And these beings,
such as God, should be able to do some mathematics. Therefore, there
must be something in mathematics that is independent of the specific
properties of the human mind. In fact, Gödel seems to have tried to
investigate the possible mathematics of non-human minds, in particular
minds that would not live in time or, at least, not in time as we know
it. 23 Gödel is looking for a general theory of rationality, a theory that
would apply to all rational beings:
(20) “While e.g. the theorems of cardinal numbers apply to
all cardinal numbers or to the system of cardinal numbers
in its whole extent, we know literally nothing that would
apply to the total existence of rational beings (to all rational
beings in all their phases of existence).” [Gödel s. d. a.,
box 8c, folder 117, item 040396, draft of a letter to Wang for
[Wang 1974]]
I will in the two next paragraphs discuss this last claim (iii) with
another example, Husserl.
8 Gödel and Husserl
Gödel most admired Husserl’s essay of 1913, Ideas pertaining to a
Pure Phenomenology. However, Gödel’s relationship to Husserl is an
ambiguous one, and it seems to evolve with time. I will give an example.
In this essay, of 1913, Husserl acknowledges that we have an intuition
of mathematical objects. But he maintains that all the constituents, all
the strata of this mathematical intuition, can be made conscious and
then appears as ‘life-experiences’ (Erlebnisse) of the ego. In other words,
the ego has in itself all that is necessary to create its objects, and it can
analyse its acts and their material. If Husserl refuses to say that the ego
creates its objects, since they existed for the ego before the ego started
this analysis, the ego may at least re-enact their creation or trace their
23. In [Gödel s. d. b., VI, 431–432], Gödel wonders about the possibilities, which
a non-Archimedean time would open.
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constitution. In this measure (even though, in Husserl’s terminology, the
‘constitution’ is not a ‘creation’), transcendental phenomenology does
not comply with claim (ii).
However, it is to be noted that Husserl’s phenomenology complies
with claim (iii). That comes from what Husserl (1913) calls the ‘a priori
of the correlation’ between the object (or, technically, the ‘noema’) and
our ‘life-experiences’. Namely, Husserl claims that when we have the
intuition of an object (when we see a red cube or when we perceive some
concept), our mental acts or, more generally, our ‘life-experiences’ are a
priori correlated to that object. Certain life-experiences are required for
the intuition of that object, so that any other being who would perceive
the same object would also have the same life-experiences. If God could
perceive this cube that I see, he would have to see in the same way that
I do and have the same life-experiences that I have [Husserl 1913, § 150].
Thus, it is possible to isolate in our internal experience a certain core
that is necessary, that is required a priori for the intuition of the object
and that, therefore, any kind of being must possess in order to perceive
the same object. Contrary to his Philosophy of Arithmetic and to his
latter Experience and Judgment, Husserl’s essay of 1913 complies with
Gödel’s last requirement.
There is at least a fragment where Gödel acknowledges a disagree-
ment with Husserl.
(21) “Transc[endantal] ego: ego in so far as it takes a cognitive
attitude and in it is guided by reason (with which it has
contact)
Husserl Ideas § 80 inconsistent: ego+reason; activity and pas-
sivity.” [Gödel s. d. a., box 1c, folder 67] 24
In the paragraph 80 of the essay of 1913, Husserl distinguishes, on
one side, life-experiences that have the character of an act and in which
the ego is present, and, on the other side, life-experiences, such as the
Hyle, that only form the surroundings, the ‘Milieu’ of mental acts, and
the material from which a peculiar process (the ‘noesis’) produces the
object of our intuition. Husserl adds that such life-experiences as the
Hyle “do not have the characteristic relation to the ego [. . . ] but they
also belong to the ego, they are his”. Now this remark could indeed
appear contradictory to Gödel. If some life-experiences do not have an
apparent relation to the ego and do not appear as ‘his’, there is then no
24. On the margin of a letter from W.A. Howard. This item is already discussed
in [Cassou-Noguès 2005].
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reason to make them part of the ego. And, in fact, in Gödel’s view, there
is at the basis of mathematical knowledge some data which do not belong
to the ego and cannot be analysed: they either come from another part
of the mind, different from the ego (possibility (B), earlier on) or they are
received passively from the outside and cannot themselves be constituted
in the ego. Husserl, in Gödel’s view, seems to include these data in the
ego, at the price of an inconsistency. In reality, an introspective analysis
of mathematical intuition, as the phenomenological analysis is, must
remain incomplete. There is, at the end, a kind of opacity, a datum that
cannot be analysed.
However, in this context, Gödel’s lecture of 1961 appears as prob-
lematic. Gödel here refers to phenomenological reflection as a possible
method for discovering new axioms. I quote two long texts that I will
then discuss.
(22) “In what manner, however, is it possible to extend our
knowledge of [. . . ] abstract concepts? [. . . ] The procedure
must thus consist, at least to a large extent, in a clarification
of meaning that does not consist in giving definitions.
Now in fact, there exists today the beginning of a science
which claims to possess a systematic method for such a clar-
ification of meaning, and that is the phenomenology founded
by Husserl. Here clarification of meaning consists in focus-
ing more sharply on the concepts concerned by directing our
attention in a certain way, namely, onto our own acts in the
use of these concepts.” [Gödel 1961, 383]
(23) “If one considers the development of a child, one notices
that it proceeds in two directions: it consists on the one hand
in experimenting with the objects of the external world and
with its [own] sensory and motor organs, on the other hand
in coming to a better and better understanding of language,
and that means—as soon as the child is beyond the most
primitive designating [of objects]—of the basic concepts on
which it rests. [. . . ] Now one may view the whole devel-
opment of empirical science as a systematic and conscious
extension of what the child does when it develops in the first
direction. [. . . and] one has examples where [. . . ] a consider-
able further development takes place in the second direction.
[. . . ] Namely, it turns out that in the systematic establish-
ment of the axioms of mathematics, new axioms, which do
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not follow by formal logic from those previously established,
again and again become evident.” [Gödel 1961, 383–384]
This second text may be related to Gödel’s letter to C. Reid (see
quotation (12)). Gödel then spoke of the ‘conceptual outfit’ that the
child already possesses and on which all science seems to rest. Here,
in quotation (23), Gödel distinguishes two directions: physical science
extends the application of these concepts to the empirical reality; math-
ematics rather proceeds from a reflection on these concepts. The first
text, quotation (22), relates the development of mathematics, the dis-
covery of new axioms, to a phenomenological reflection. It is by turning
our attention onto the activity involved in the intuition of a concept that
we can find new axioms concerning that concept. Such a reflection is, in
Husserl’s phenomenology, an analysis of the constitution of the concept,
an analysis that will eventually make clear all our ‘life-experiences’ and
enable the ego to trace the constitution of the concept.
This text then frankly contradicts Gödel’s argument for the objec-
tivity of mathematics. For example, in quotation (6), Gödel argued
that, if the ego had created its objects out of nothing, then it would
be able to discover all their properties simply by analysing its acts
(“by raising his creative activity from the subconscious to the conscious
level”). And Gödel denied that this was possible. But, in quotation
(22) and the remainder of the lecture of 1961, Gödel precisely refers to
such an introspective analysis. He argues that such a reflexive analy-
sis would lead to the discovery of axioms, and, eventually, give a non-
mechanical procedure that would overcome the incompleteness results.
Now the introspective analysis seems to enable one to obtain all the
properties of the objects, so that it seems (if one applies Gödel’s ear-
lier criterion) that the ego could have created its objects out of noth-
ing. In fact, Gödel’s uncritical reference to Husserl seems to indicate
that he now considers it possible to trace back the constitution of
mathematical objects in the ego.
That would also contradict quotation (21) on Husserl’s inconsis-
tency. This fragment implied that the reflexive analysis in Husserl’s
phenomenology must be incomplete. Sooner or later, it must meet a
datum that can no longer be analysed, either because the datum is
simply received from the outside or because it is produced in a part
of the mind to which the ego has no access. However, in the lecture
of 1961, the reflexive procedure seems to lead to a complete analysis
of mathematical concepts.
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Thus, the lecture of 1961 contradicts other texts on the question of
mathematical objectivity. It is difficult to give it a status. The notes
from the unpublished papers may not always be dated. However, there
is evidence that Gödel holds claims (ii), or (ii’), in 1964 and later on, at
the time of his conversation with Wang. One could imagine a possible
scenario with three parts: In 1946 (with “Russell’s mathematical logic”)
and still in 1951, Gödel would have held a strong Platonism such as
described in claim (i); his reading of Husserl in the mid-fifties would
have led him to abandon that position and, for a time, around 1961, to
adopt a strictly phenomenological attitude; however he would have come
back around 1964 to a weak Platonism described by claims (ii) and (iii),
and relying on an argument that he had devised earlier. I must admit
that I do not know the motivations of these changes.
Conclusion
My aim, in this paper, has been to distinguish, using Gödel’s texts,
three different meanings for the objectivity of mathematics. There is
first a strong claim:
(i) “mathematics describes a non-sensual reality, which exists
independently both of the acts and of the dispositions of the
human mind.”
Thus, our theories describe an ideal reality. Set theory describes a
universe of sets that exists in itself. Putting aside Gödel’s vocabulary, I
think one could reserve the term “Platonism” for such a strong position,
which Gödel has held, in 1946 in his paper on “Russell’s mathematical
logic”, as in fact Russell himself.
Now, one can find a material in Gödel’s writings to define two weaker
meanings for the objectivity in mathematics.
(ii’) mathematical theories have not been invented “by the
ego” (i. e. consciously) and “out of nothing”.
(iii) mathematics (or something in mathematics) is indepen-
dent of the specific properties of the human being.
Claim (iii) concerns the non-anthropological character of mathemat-
ics. Though Gödel does not use the term in this context, claim (iii)
can be considered as giving another meaning to the idea of ‘objectivity’.
Claims (ii) and (iii) characterise two different versions of the objectivity
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of mathematics. They are independent: Brouwer according to Gödel
holds (ii) but not (iii), whereas Husserl could hold (iii) but not (ii). The
conjunction of (ii) and (iii) does not imply (i). Gödel, in 1964, holds (ii)
and (iii) but not (i). Thus, again putting aside Gödel’s own terminology,
claims (ii) and (iii) may be considered as two different ways to reach a
non Platonistic objectivity in philosophy of mathematics.
The importance of these two claims (ii) and (iii) is that they clarify
the meaning of “objectivity” in philosophy of mathematics. They would
permit an analysis of positions in philosophy of mathematics, both tra-
ditional and contemporary. 25
Claim (ii) Yes No
Claim (iii)
Yes Gödel in 1964 Husserl’s
phenomenology
No Brouwer,
according to Gödel
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